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A Common Lawyer's View of His Civilian Colleagues"
E. Allan Farnsworth"

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the difficulty of conversations between cultures has become
a fashionable subject of discourse. If you have seen, perhaps even read, a
popular book entitled "Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus," you may
recall that it bears the alternate title, "A Practical Guide for Improving
Communication and Getting What You Want in Your Relationships."' The
relationships meant are, ofcourse, those with the other culture-the opposite sex.
But you may also want to bridge other cultural gaps than those engendered by
gender, for instance the gap between common lawyers and their civilian
colleagues. It is this gap that I will address.
To begin with, I must confess that, unlike many of my distinguished
predecessors in the Tucker Lecture series-such as Ren6 David, Paul Andr6
Cr6peau, and Andr6 Tunc (to mention just a few from the French tradition)--I
am neither a civilian nor a card-carrying comparatist. I have never taught a
comparative law course, never belonged to an organization of comparatists, and
never reveled at one of the congresses held by comparatists in exotic parts of the
world. So I come to my topic as a simple common lawyer. I have, however,
some familiarity with the problems of communication between our two legal
cultures as a result of having negotiated and drafted with civilians in two
important endeavors.
The first came during the decade of the 1970s, when I represented the
United States at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) in the negotiation and drafting that culminated in the diplomatic
conference in Vienna that produced the United Nations (Vienna) Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The Convention is a multilateral
treaty to which the United States and over forty other countries are now parties.
It governs contracts for the international sale of goods much as Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code governs domestic sales.
The second opportunity came during the 1980s and early 1990s when, for
roughly a decade, I was a member of the group at the International (Rome)
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) that recently produced
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. The
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Principles, in contrast to the Convention, are not a treaty but merely a set of
rules that the parties to a contract are free to incorporate by agreement. They are
designed to be suitable for contracts for services as well as for sales.
It would be a mistake to suppose that the only cultural differences that
needed to be resolved in UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT were those between
common lawyers and civilians. There were differences between the industrialized countries and the developing countries, and there were differences, at the
times in question, between the free market countries and the socialist countries.
I will not go into these, however, confining my remarks to the differences
between those of us who are common lawyers and our civilian colleagues.
I can assure those of you who are students that the course in comparative
law I had in law school gave me at least a passing familiarity with the civil law
that was indispensable in coping with those differences.2 Those of you who
study law here in Louisiana have a unique opportunity to acquire more than a
passing familiarity with the civil law, and you never know when it will come in
handy. When the distinguished jurist James Kent went on the bench in New
York in the early nineteenth century, he described how his familiarity with the
civil law came in handy:
I made much use of the Corpus Juris, and as the judges (Livingston
excepted) knew nothing of French or civil law, I had immense
advantage over them
I will speak mainly of the differences and peculiarities that Ihave found--on
both sides-when common lawyers meet with civilian colleagues. But just as
there are differences among civilians, so too there are differences among
common lawyers. So, I begin with a few observations about the peculiarities of
American common lawyers that distinguish them from the English, the
Australians, the Ghanaians, and others of our breed.
II. AMERICAN PECULIARITIES
In one way we Americans are closer than our common law brethren to our

civilian colleagues, for we Americans come with our own codifications,
something quite unknown in other common law systems. Just as civilians look
first to the provisions of their codes and only then to the cases that have applied
those provisions, we Americans do the same with our Uniform Commercial
Code. In this we are unique in the common law world. Jurists the world over
are familiar with our Uniform Commercial Code. And while my civilian

2. See E. Allan Famsworth, Looking in from Outside your Garden: Another View of
Comparative Law, in The Responsiveness of Legal Systems to Foreign Influences 413, 422 (Swiss
Institute of Comparative law 1992).
3. Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-RevolutionaryAmerica, 52 Va. L. Rev.

403, 40s (1966).
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colleagues at the UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT meetings had little interest in
decisions of common law courts, whether from America or England or
elsewhere, their attitude toward our Code was quite different. Indeed, the
Uniform Commercial Code has been one of our best exports.4 When
UNCITRAL met in New York, my civilian colleagues occasionally commissioned me to buy them copies of the Code at my law school's bookstore. The
delegate from the Soviet Union had translated the Code into Russian. It is not
surprising that one can find traces of the Code scattered throughout the Vienna
Convention and the UNIDROIT Principles.
As you probably know, the Uniform Commercial Code has a particular civil
law influence because of its principal moving force, Karl Llewellyn (of whom
Chancellor Hawkland spoke in his Tucker Lecture last year). As a teenager,
Llewellyn had been sent to a Gymnasium in Mecklenburg, Germany, in the
thought that he might find more profit there than in high school at home in
Brooklyn. When the first World War broke out, Llewellyn's affection for
Germany took him from a Paris caf6 to the front with the German army. He was
wounded, hospitalized, and awarded the Iron Cross. After the war, he twice
taught at Leipzig as a visiting professor and maintained a lifelong interest in civil
law in general and in German law in particular.3 It is, therefore, no coincidence
that a centerpiece of the Code is the concept of good faith-much as the
analogous concept of Treu und Glauben is a centerpiece of the German Civil
Code. Were it not for this kinship of the Code with its European cousins, it
might, I assume, have been more difficult in 1993 for Louisiana to have achieved
a compromise between Louisiana law and the Code in your new civil code
provisions on sale of goods.
In addition to our Code, we Americans have our Restatement. And though
you have been taught that the authority of a Restatement is not that of legislation,
the fact that the form of the Restatement resembles that of a code is not lost on
our civil law colleagues.
I turn now from differences among common lawyers to the main subject at
hand-differences between common lawyers and their civilian colleagues. I will
treat differences of approach, style, terminology, and substance. First then, a
difference of approach.

4. This is so though it has been said by a distinguished comparatist that "[a]ny comparative
appraisal of the Uniform Commercial Code is rendered difficult by its lack of basic similarity with
the typical European or Latin-American commercial codes." Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Uniform
Commercial Code in the Light ofComparative Law, in I Study of the Uniform Commercial Code

57, 74 (N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Leg. Doc. No. 65(A) (1955)).
5. He also spent brief periods before the war at the universities of Lausanne and Paris. See
William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, ch. 6and Appendix A (1985). See also
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Vol'. A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources

for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156 (1987).
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III. A DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH
Common lawyers and their civilian colleagues have traditionally taken very
different views as to the role of legislation. Here is the view of Portalis,
reflected in the French civil code: "The function of the law (loi] is to fix, in
broad outline, the general maxims of justice [droit], to establish principles rich
in suggestiveness [consiquences], and not to descend into the details."6 A
corollary of this view that a code should contain general principles is that a code
contains all ofthe required general principles-it is a seamless body of law with
no gaps. To simplify everything is an undertaking the value of which we would
all have to admit. To anticipate everything is a goal impossible of achievement.
Grant Gilmore, architect of Article 9 of our Uniform Commercial Code,
described a civilian code as
a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the field and which is
assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible questions: thus
when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to
find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy
of the codifying law....
It is in this vein that Article 4 of your Louisiana Civil Code provides, "[w]hen
no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the
court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is
made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages." By way of contrast, a common
lawyer's code is still, to some extent, viewed as a collection of diverse statutes
enacted against the backdrop of the common law. This view is reflected in a
tradition of narrow construction of statutes by common law courts that would
startle our civilian colleagues. Certainly no civilian would have authored the
remark of a learned English observer in 1882 that some of the rules of statutoiy
interpretation in his country's courts "cannot well be accounted for except on the
theory that Parliament generally changes the law for the worse, and that the
business of the judge is to keep the mischief of its interference within the
narrowest possible bounds."'
I should interject here, since many of my
quotations are from across the Atlantic, that English drafting-though assumed
by many civilians to be identical to ours-differs from American drafting, and
I much prefer the latter. But, both differ markedly from the civilian view.
Section 1-103 of the Commercial Code makes it clear that this code is not, as
Gilmore put it, "a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the field and

6. Jean tinne Marie Portalis et al., Discours prdliminaire (1827), as quoted in Arthur T. v(M
Mehren & James R.Gordley, The Civil Law System 54 (1977).
7. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Caue and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961).

8. La. Civ. Code art. 4.
9. Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics 85 (1882).
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which is assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible questions. . .. "'o
That section provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions."" Observe
that the reference is not, as in the Louisiana code, to "justice" and "reason," but
to "law and equity," which means to a common lawyer the body of case
law-from law courts and equity courts-that antedated the Code. The Code
states what I call the "Swiss cheese theory" of code interpretation: Regard the
Code as a piece of Swiss cheese with all its holes, and if, when you search for
a solution to your case, you find a hole in the Code, look through it to the
backdrop of case law. Here is a major difference in approach between ourselves
and the civilians.
How did we common lawyers and the civilians work out this difference in
the Vienna Convention? The more numerous civilians had some success. What
they got, in article 7(2), was this: "Questions concerning matters governed by
this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based."'" Portalis would
have approved this invitation to reason by analogy. But we common lawyers
also had some success. What we.got, in the balance of article 7(2) was this: "In
the absence of such principles, [matters not expressly settled by the Convention
are to be settled] in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law."' 3 Here is a recognition of the Swiss cheese theory:
Look at the Convention as a piece of Swiss cheese, and, if you see a hole in the
Convention, look through it to the backdrop of the law that would otherwise
apply under choice of law rules. This concession to the common lawyers was
all the more remarkable because the predecessor of the Vienna Convention-the
less widely adopted Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods-had said
exactly the opposite. It had explicitly rejected the Swiss cheese theory by
excluding rules of private international law "for the purposes of the application
of the present Law."''
From a difference of approach, I turn to a difference of style.

IV. A DIFFERENCE OF STYLE
Anyone who compares the writing styles of jurists, whether in drafting
legislation, opinions, contracts, or whatnot, cannot fail to notice that common
lawyers are more prolix than their civilian counterparts and that American jurists
are the most prolix of all. The poet John Donne-who knew English lawyers
from his education at Lincoln's Inn-thus caricatured those lawyers nearly four
centuries ago:

10. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 1043.
11. U.C.C. § 1-103.

12. United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods, art. 7(2).
13. Id.
14. Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods art: 2.
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In parchments then, large as his fields, he draws
Assurances, bigge as gloss'd civill laws,
So huge that men (in our times forwardnesse)
Are Fathers of the Church for writing lesse.'5
The propensity of common lawyers to write on and on has elicited a variety of
plausible explanations, 6 and I have one of my own to add--one that may
appeal to the student reader. It is that the lecture method practiced for centuries
by our civilian colleagues in their great law schools, such as Bologna and Paris,
reassures the student: all will be well if you will only trust the application of our
great general principles. This is not just the case for civilian lawyers. According
to the French mathematician Jules Henri Poincar6, "on the Continent [mechanics]
is taught always more or less as a deductive and d priori science."" But
instruction in the common law, particularly by the Socratic method practiced in
this country, proceeds on a very different assumption. To again quote Poincar6:
"The English teach mechanics as an experimental science."' 8 In common law,
faculties experiment with our cases, real and hypothetical, and discuss everything
that can possibly go wrong with a transaction. Far from reassuring our students,
we produce in them a profound, if healthy neurosis, which can only be alleviated
when later called upon to draft by resorting to detail in the hope of covering all
variations oftheir model. No wonder that common lawyers draw, as John Donne
put it, "Assurances ... So huge that men ... Are Fathers of the Church for
writing lesse.' 9
Everything we common lawyers write tends to the longer than what our
civilian colleagues write, but this is particularly true of statutes. Civilians are
comfortable with legislation, reflecting the view of Portalis, that it should only
"fix, in broad outline, the general maxims" and not "descend into the details."2
Not so the common lawyer. For in spite of the current flood of legislation in all
common law countries, common lawyers are still more comfortable with cases.
Most would subscribe to the confession of Lord Coke centuries ago that, "[i]f it
be common law, I should be ashamed if I could not give you a ready answer; but
if it be statute law, I should be equally ashamed if I answered you immediately."2' The common lawyer's mistrust of legislation was put to good use by W.
S. Gilbert in lolanthe:

IS. John Donne, A Selection of His Poetry 104 (Penguin ed. 1952).
16. For explanations of differences in contract drafting, see John Langbein, Comparative Civil
Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 381 (1987); Georges A. Van
Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Common.Law Lawyer, in International Contracts: Choice of Law
and Language 5, 10 (Willis L.M. Reese ed. 1962).
17. H. Poincare, Science and Hypothesis 89 (1952).
18. Id.
19. See Donne, supra note 15.
20. Portalis et al., supra note 6.
21. As quoted in Humphry W. Woolrych, The Life of the Right Honourable Sir Edward Colo,
Knt. 197 (1826).
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And while the House of Peers withholds its legislative hand,
And noble statesmen do not itch
To interfere with matters which
They do not understand,
As bright will shine Great Britain's rays
As in King George's glorious days.'
Against this mistrust, common lawyers who draft legislation use the defense
of prolixity. So it is that the Uniform Commercial Code takes about 220 words
to state the seller's implied obligations as to quality of goods while the Vienna
Convention takes only 160 (and would probably have taken less if common
lawyers had not had their hand in it).
For a graphic demonstration of the difference, take the matter of definitions.
Definitions are largely alien to the civilian tradition. You have only a few
avowed definitions in your Louisiana Civil Code. (I say "avowed" definitions
because it is not uncommon for civilian codes to conceal definitions as
substantive rules--as your Louisiana Civil Code does for such terms as
"confirmation" and "ratification," which appear in the guise of substantive
rules.')
In contrast, to make sure that unfriendly common law judges will not
misinterpret legislation, legislatures in common law countries provide judges with
a profusion of definitions. Article 2 of our Code begins with a list of three
dozen definitions peculiar to the sale of goods, in addition to the nearly fifty
general definitions in Article 1, for a total of over eighty. You may recall Lord
Mildew's dictum in Bluff v. FatherGray: "If Parliament does not mean what
it says, it must say so." 4 By definitions, the common lawyer attempts to say
SO.

How did the common lawyers and the civilians work out this difference in
the Vienna Convention? Here the civilians-more numerous than the common
lawyers--prevailed. True to the civilian tradition, the Convention lacks avowed
definitions-though there are a few concealed ones, since provisions such as that
of article 25 on "fundamental breach" are plainly definitional.
From this difference of style, I turn to a difference of terminology.

22. William S.Gilbert, lolanthe or the Peer and the Peri (Lord Mountararat's Sont) Act 2.
23. The Louisiana Civil Code has a few definitions designated as definitions: see, e.g., La. Civ.
Code art. 1756 (entitled "Obligations; definition"); La. Civ. Code art. 1763 (entitled simply
"Definition" and defining a "real obligation"); La. Civ. Code art. 1825 (also entitled simply
"Definition" and defining "subrogation"). Other definitions are held out as substantive rules: see,
e.g.. La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (entitled "Confirmation" but containing a definition of "confirmation");
La. Civ. Code art. 1843 (entitled "Ratification" but containing a definition of "ratification").
24. A.P. Herbert, The Uncommon Law 313 (7th ed. 1950), as quoted in Hupman v. Cook, 640
F.2d 497, 504 (4th Cir. 1981).
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V. A DIFFERENCE OF TERMINOLOGY

Discussions at UNCITRAL went on in six official languages, those at
UNIDROIT in two working languages. The problem of translation sometimes
exposed differences in terminology. Thus, you will find that the English text of
the UNIDROIT Principles uses the term "good faith and fair dealing," while the
equally authentic French text says only "bonne foi"--on the ground that "fair
dealing" is implicit in the French term for good faith. And those from the
French tradition will be amused to find that the UNIDROIT Principles render
force majeure the same way in English, while those from the English tradition
will enjoy finding that the Principles render "hardship" the same way in French.
Aside from such questions of translation, the legal jargon of common
lawyers differs from that of our civilian colleagues. Every common lawyer
knows that in a sale of goods it is the buyer who is the "debtor" and the seller
who is the "creditor," because it is the buyer who owes the price to the seller.
And every civilian knows that in such a transaction it is the seller'who is
commonly called the "debtor" and the buyer the "creditor," because it is the
seller who has the duty to render the characteristic performance, delivery of the
goods. This difference was resolved in the UNIDROIT Principles when I joined
the Working Group by deleting the words "debtor" and "creditor" from the
original drafts, prepared by civilians, and replacing them with "obligor" and
"obligee."
Then there is the matter of Latin maxims. Common lawyers now enter the
profession with no more Latin than expressiounius and ejusdem geners-iftthat.
Our civilian colleagues, however, at least those from Europe, cherish such
singular maxims as suum cuique tribuere (to render to everyone his own).
Nothing can be done about this in polite conversation. But in drafting both
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT have accepted the principle that Latin words are
not to be used. While the older and "Eurocentric" Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods spoke of "ipsofacto avoidance," its successor, the
Vienna Convention, has nothing but English words.
I now turn from approach and style to substance.
VI.

SOME DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE

What differences ofsubstance divided the common lawyers and their civilian
colleagues at UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT? Though there were many, I shall
confine myself to three that arose at both UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT and that
were particularly troublesome: the duty of good faith performance, the
availability of specific performance, and the enforceability of penalty clauses.
First, we consider good faith. The concept of good faith plays a major role
in civilian contract law. The most remarkable example is Article 242 of the
German Civil Code, which requires parties to observe Treu und Glauben-afew
words that have spawned a vast outpouring of caselaw. To the civilian mind,
good faith is a broad reaching concept that covers far more territory than the
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comparable provision of Uniform Commercial Code 1-203, which requires good
faith in the performance of contracts.2 English law, at the opposite extreme
from the civilians, adamantly refuses to recognize any such duty of good faith
whatsoever. The common lawyers at UNCITRAL, uneasy with the vague and
expansive civilian concept of good faith performance, adamantly refused to
accept a provision in the Vienna Convention requiring good faith performance;
the civilians sternly insisted on the inclusion of such a provision. Which camp
prevailed? Consider article 7(2): "In the interpretation of this Convention,
regard is to be had to ... the need to promote.., good faith in international
trade." What should you make of this? The common lawyer will tell you
that since it speaks only to the interpretation of the Convention, it was a harmless
compromise that cannot possibly impose a duty of good faith on the contracting
parties. But some civilians suggest that it is a Trojan horse that will enable a
civilian judge or arbitrator to impose a duty of good faith on a contracting party.
Not a very happy compromise between the two views. What do the UNIDROIT
Principles say? No compromise there. Under article 1.7, each party "must act
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.... -27 A clear victory for the
civilians.
Second, we turn to specific performance. As most of you know, courts in
civilian legal systems routinely grant specific performance by ordering parties to
perform their contracts. But courts in common law systems, for reasons that are
largely historical, regard specific performance as an "extraordinary" remedy, to
be granted only when an award of damages would not be "adequate."2 (I
might add here that we Americans sometimes rationalize the denial of specific
performance on the ground that this permits a party to a contract to commit an
"efficient breach," but that concept of law and economics is one that not only
does not travel well, but that struck most of my civilian colleagues as bordering
on the immoral.) How, then, was this fundamental difference resolved in the
Vienna Convention?
Look first at article 46, which provides that a "buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations. ."..", Here it seems that the civilians
carried the day. But now look at article 28, which provides that if a party "is
entitled to require performance of... the other party, a court is not bound to
enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under
its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale."3 This was a victory for the
common lawyers, but think of what it means. Suppose that an importer of some
standard commodity such as spices has a choice between suing an exporter in

25. La. Civ. Code art. 1759: "Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee
in whatever pertains to the obligation."
26. United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods, art. 7(2).
27. UNIDROIT, art 1.7.
28. See 3 Farnsworth on Contracts § 12.4 (1990).
29. United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods, art. 46.
30. Id. at art. 28.
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London or in Paris. If suit is in London, article 28 will qualify article 46, and
the English court will not be required to grant specific performance. It would
not do so under English law for a contract to sell spices, so it is not required to
do so under the Convention. But if suit is in Paris, article 28 does not affect the
French court. Since it would routinely grant specific performance under French
law, the importer can get specific performance under article 46. The result under
this awkward compromise therefore turns on which forum-London or
Paris-the plaintiff chooses, a less than satisfactory result for a convention
intended to make law uniform.
How do the UNIDROIT Principles resolve this difference? Article 7.2.2
begins by providing that "[w]here a party who owes an obligation other than one
to pay money does not perform, the other party may require performance."31
The Principles have no provision comparable to the awkward compromise of
article 28 of the Vienna Convention. Instead, under an exception to the general
rule of article 7.2.2, a party that "may reasonably obtain performance from
another source"32 cannot require performance, which brings the rule close to the
traditional common law position.
Finally, we come to penalty clauses. Another profound difference between
these two legal cultures relates to the validity of penalty clauses. Civilians
generally find nothing objectionable in provisions imposing penalties for breach.
Courts in common law countries, however-again for reasons that are largely
historical-refuse to enforce provisions imposing penalties (unless, of course,
they are cleverly disguised as "liquidated damages"). How did the Vienna
Convention resolve this difference? It did not resolve it at all, because the
subject was considered "too hot to handle." The Convention, therefore, has no
provision on penalties. When the Convention was finished, UNCITRAL created
another Working Group, which attempted to draft a special convention on this
touchy subject. But it was indeed "too hot." While UNCITRAL did produce its
Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due Upon Failure of

Performance, they were buried with a pious Resolution of the General Assembly
in 1983 that admonishes courts to give "serious consideration" to the Rules and
"where appropriate, implement them." No country has, and it is unlikely that
any country ever will.
What about penalties under the UNIDROIT Principles? Surprisingly, article

7.4.13 says: "Where the contract provides that a party who does not perform is
to pay a specified sum to the aggrieved party for ...non-performance, the

aggrieved party is entitled to that sum irrespective of its actual harm."33 A
court or arbitrator may, however, reduce the sum to a reasonable amount if it is
"grossly excessive." What was too hot for UNCITRAL to handle was easily
dispatched by the drafters of the Principles, and in accord with the civilian view.

31. UNIDROIT, art. 7.2.2.
32. UNIDROIT, art.
7.2.2(c).
33. UNIDROIT, art. 7.4.13.
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VII. A DIFFERENCE AND AN EXPLANATION
Here, then, are three examples dealing with good faith, specific performance,
and penalties. In the case of good faith UNCITRAL achieved an ambiguous
compromise. In the case of specific performance UNCITRAL settled for a clear
but non-uniform compromise, and in the case of penalties UNCITRAL was
unable to do anything effective. And yet as to all three, the UNIDROIT
Principles have clear solutions-not compromises-the first and third generally
in accord with the civilian view and the second close to the common law
position. (I should note in passing that while I have had time to discuss only
these three particularly troublesome examples, the solutions to the three that I
have discussed reflect what I think was the dominance of the civilian view at
UNIDROIT.) What can be the reasons for this difference and the apparantly
greater success of the UNIDROIT Principles in resolving differences between
common lawyers and civilians? Here are two.
First, the Vienna Convention is a multilateral treaty-along with a
constitution, the highest form of legislation. The UNIDROIT Principles are not
legislation at all, but merely terms that the parties can incorporate if they so
choose. This is a particularly compelling explanation in the case of specific
performance. Under the proposed revision of Article 2 of our Uniform
Commercial Code, a court will be permitted to grant specific performance "if the
parties have expressly agreed to that remedy."34 And if the parties have
incorporated the Principles, they have so agreed. But this is not the only
explanation.
Second, the United Nations is a politicized organization, and, at the time in
question, UNCITRAL had within it clusters of industrialized, socialist, and
developing countries. In United Nations commissions such as UNCITRAL,
delegates represent their governments, procedure is formal, and interventions are
translated into the official languages, which had become six in number by the
time of the diplomatic conference in Vienna. UNCITRAL, on the contrary, is
less politicized-in its origins largely Eurocentric. In its Working Groups
members do not serve as government representatives, procedure is often
informal, and interventions are often not translated into the other of the two
working languages.
For these reasons it proved to be easier for both groups, common lawyers
and civilians, to make concessions at UNIDROIT than at UNCITRAL.
Although-indeed, perhaps because--the results at UNIDROIT were less
dramatic than those at UNCITRAL, the ability to work together and reach
effective compromises were greater. If common lawyers are from, say, Saturn
and civilians are from, say, Jupiter, A Practical Guide for Improving Communication between the two would do well to look to the model of UNIDROIT.

34. U.C.C. § 2-707 (proposed revision July 1996).

